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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2020, the Supreme Court of Canada heard appeals from three
provincial references concerning the constitutionality of the federal Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act.1 The Act imposes a “carbon tax” on fuels and industrial
activities in “listed provinces” the federal Governor in Council has decided have not
*

Josh Hunter, B.A. (Hons.) (McMaster), LL.B., M.B.A., MTS (Toronto), LL.M.
(Cantab.) is Deputy Director of Ontario’s Constitutional Law Branch and lead counsel for
Ontario in the references concerning the constitutionality of the federal Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act. The views expressed in this article are the personal views of Mr.
Hunter and should not be taken as the views of either the Attorney General of Ontario or the
Government of Ontario.
1

S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186.
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placed sufficiently stringent prices on greenhouse gas emissions.2 Saskatchewan,
Ontario and Alberta brought references to their Courts of Appeal seeking an opinion
on the validity of the Act.3 The majorities in Saskatchewan and Ontario affirmed the
validity of the Act under the national concern branch of the federal peace, order and
good government (“POGG”) power. In the opinion of the majority in Alberta, most
of the Act was ultra vires Parliament.4
The hearing this fall was the ﬁrst time the Supreme Court has considered the
proper scope of the national concern doctrine in 23 years.5 The federal government
and its supporters argued the Act is necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
meet Canada’s international commitments and combat climate change. The challenging provinces and their supporters argued that upholding the Act would open the
door to broad federal regulation of almost every aspect of human activity. The
Court’s decision will shape the balance of federal-provincial relations for decades to
come.
This article will summarize the precedents that currently govern the test for
determining when a matter is suitable for federal regulation under the national
concern doctrine. It will then discuss how the national concern doctrine should be
2

Despite being colloquially referred to as a “carbon tax”, the federal government was
clear when the Act was before Parliament that the Act did not impose taxation; rather, it
imposed regulatory charges intended to change consumer and industry behaviour. Canada,
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 148, No. 279 (April 16, 2018), at
18317. In addition to the federalism issues discussed in this paper, the Supreme Court will
also be asked to determine whether the charges imposed by the Act are valid behavioural
modiﬁcation regulatory charges or unauthorized disguised taxation. Nor are the substances on
whose use the Act imposes charges limited to carbon — some 33 different substances are
listed as “greenhouse gases” in Schedule 3 of the Act.
3
A reference is a procedure whereby the federal or provincial Executive can ask the
Supreme Court of Canada (for federal references) or the provincial Court of Appeal (for
provincial references) to provide an advisory opinion on the questions set out in the reference.
An appeal lies as of right from a provincial reference decision to the Supreme Court of
Canada. See, e.g., Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, ss. 36 and 53; Constitutional
Questions Act, 2012, S.S. 2012, c. C-29.01, ss. 2-11; Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
C.43, s. 8; Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s. 26.
4
The Alberta majority was not asked to and did not ﬁnd Part 3 (applying provincial
carbon pricing schemes to works and undertakings whose operations fall within Parliament’s
legislative authority, federal Crown land, Indigenous land, and the internal waters, territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of Canada) or Part 4 (requiring the federal
Minister of the Environment to report to Parliament on the Act’s administration) of the Act
unconstitutional.
5

From when a minority of the Court considered the doctrine in R. v. Hydro-Québec,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.). Thirty-two years after the entire panel
sitting gave it detailed consideration in R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J.
No. 23 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.).
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modernized to ensure Parliament cannot too easily acquire jurisdiction over broad
swathes of human activity that have traditionally fallen under provincial jurisdiction
without the need to seek a constitutional amendment with provincial support.
Finally, this article will examine why the Supreme Court should ﬁnd the Act is not
supportable under the national concern doctrine: its pith and substance is the
regulation of greenhouse gases, a matter that is not single, distinct and indivisible
and that does not have a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is
reconcilable with the constitutional division of powers as required by the national
concern jurisprudence.
II. THE GREENHOUSE GAS POLLUTION PRICING ACT
Parliament passed the Act in 2018. Despite recognizing that there were nonpricing-based policy options available, the Act was designed to ensure that every
province put a price on carbon acceptable to the federal Cabinet or face a federal
“backstop” charge. To do so, the Act imposes “charges” in “listed provinces” the
federal Governor in Council decides have not put a sufficiently stringent price on
greenhouse gas producing fuels (Part 1) or industrial greenhouse gas emissions
(Part 2).6
1.

Fuel Charges

Part 1 imposes “charges” on “fuel” and “combustible waste” in “listed provinces”. The Governor in Council can prescribe any substance, material or thing as
a “fuel” or “combustible waste”. The Governor in Council has virtually unfettered
discretion to impose other “charges” on “fuel” and “combustible waste”.7 The
Minister of National Revenue must distribute all fuel “charges” collected in respect
of a province to the province itself, prescribed persons, persons of a prescribed class,
persons meeting prescribed conditions or a combination thereof.8
2.

Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Part 2 imposes “charges” on industrial greenhouse gas emitters that meet criteria
prescribed by the Governor in Council or are designated by the federal Minister of
the Environment. The Governor in Council can also determine which gases are
“greenhouse gases”.9
Covered facilities that emit more than their “emissions limit” must remit
“compliance units” to the Minister or pay an “excess emissions charge” to Her
Majesty in right of Canada. Covered facilities that emit less than their emissions
6

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 3, 166(2)-(3), 169,
172(1), 189(1)-(2), Sch. 1.
7

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 3, 17-27, 166, Sch. 2.

8

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, s. 165.

9

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 169, 172, 190, 192,
Sch. 3; Output-Based Pricing System Regulations, SOR/2019-266.
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limit are issued “surplus credits” that can be used as compliance units. The Governor
in Council can create other means of acquiring, trading or recognizing compliance
units.10
The Governor in Council may set emissions limits and increase the rate of excess
emissions charges.11 The Minister of National Revenue is required to distribute
charges collected in respect of a province to the province itself, prescribed persons,
persons of a prescribed class, persons meeting prescribed conditions or a combination thereof.12
The Act attempts to force all provinces to adopt the federal government’s
preferred policy approach to combatting greenhouse gases — putting a price on
greenhouse gas–producing fuels and industrial greenhouse gas emissions — or face
having federal “backstop” charges imposed on their residents. Alternative approaches that do not involve carbon pricing are not sufficient to avoid application of
the federal “backstop”, even if they meet or exceed the federal government’s own
stated reduction targets.
The federal government is currently using most of its Part 1 revenues to pay
“Climate Action Incentive” credits to individuals in listed provinces. Despite its
name, the credit amount is not based on whether an individual has taken any action
to mitigate climate change and need not be spent on such mitigation. The amount of
the credit is based solely on an individual’s province of residence, number of
dependants and whether the individual lives in an urban or rural area.13
The remainder of the revenues raised by Part 1 will be paid out to small and
medium-sized businesses, municipalities, educational institutions, hospitals, nonproﬁt organizations and Indigenous communities under yet-to-be-decided formulae.
The federal government issued a discussion paper asking for suggestions on how to
spend the revenues raised by Part 2 but has not yet decided how it will do so.14
The federal government has also announced its intention to introduce further
legislative measures to “set legally-binding, ﬁve-year emissions-reductions milestones” that will exceed current 2030 targets and lead towards net-zero emissions by
2050.15
10

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 169, 171, 173-175.

11

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 191, 192, Sch. 4.

12

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, s. 188.

13

Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2, S.C. 2018, c. 27, s. 13.

14

Canada, Department of Finance, “Backgrounder: Ensuring Transparency” (October 23,
2018); Canada, Ontario and pollution pricing (March 7, 2019); Canada, Canada announces
next steps to drive clean growth and climate action (June 28, 2019); Canada, Use of proceeds
from the federal Output-Based Pricing System (August 20, 2019).
15

Mandate Letter from the Office of the Prime Minister to the Minister of Environment
and Climate Change (December 13, 2019); Canada, House of Commons, Speech from the
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III. THE REFERENCES
In April 2018, Saskatchewan brought a reference asking whether the thenproposed Act was intra vires Parliament. In August 2018, Ontario brought a
reference as well. The Saskatchewan reference was heard in February 2019 and the
Ontario reference in April 2019.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal released its decision in May 2019.16 Chief
Justice Richards (Jackson and Schwann JJ.A. concurring) found that establishing
minimum national standards of price stringency for greenhouse gas emissions falls
within federal jurisdiction as a matter of national concern and that the Act could be
supported by that federal head of power. Justices Ottenbreit and Caldwell (dissenting)
found the Act could not be supported under the national concern doctrine or any
other head of federal power.
The Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in June 2019.17 Chief Justice
Strathy (MacPherson and Sharpe JJ.A. concurring) found that “establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” was a new matter of
national concern that could support the Act. Associate Chief Justice Hoy (concurring)
identiﬁed a narrower matter, relating only to setting national minimum standards for
greenhouse gas emission pricing. Justice Huscroft (dissenting) would have found
that the Act could not be supported under the national concern doctrine.
Saskatchewan and Ontario both appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Shortly thereafter, in June 2019, a new government in Alberta launched its own
reference to its Court of Appeal, which was heard in December 2019. The Alberta
court released its decision in February 2020.18 Chief Justice Fraser, Watson and
Hughes JJ.A. held that the national concern doctrine could only apply to matters that
fell outside the speciﬁc enumerated provincial powers. As the provinces can regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under their enumerated powers,19 there was no scope for
the national concern doctrine to apply. In the alternative, they held that greenhouse
gas emissions did not meet the test to be recognized as a new matter of national
Throne, 43rd Parl. (December 5, 2019). On November 19, 2020, the government introduced
Bill C-12, the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act which, if passed, would
legally bind the federal government to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. It has not yet
released details of how it intends to do so.
16
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] S.J. No. 156, 2019 SKCA
40 (Sask. C.A.).
17
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
ONCA 544 (Ont. C.A.).
18

Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74 (Alta. C.A.).
19

Including their powers over natural resources and electricity generation (s. 92A), their
own property (s. 109), property and civil rights including nuisance and trespass (s. 92(13)),
local works and undertakings (s. 92(10)), and public lands (s. 92(5)).
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concern. For somewhat different reasons, Wakeling J.A. came to much the same
conclusion. Justice Feehan (dissenting) would have held that “effect[ing] behavioural change throughout Canada leading to increased energy efficiencies by the use
of minimum national standards necessary and integral to the stringent pricing of
greenhouse gas emissions” was a new matter of national concern that could support
the Act.20
The Saskatchewan and Ontario appeals were originally scheduled to be heard by
the Supreme Court of Canada in March 2020 but were adjourned due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. After they were adjourned, British Columbia appealed the
Alberta court’s decision.21 All three appeals were heard together on September 22
and 23, 2020.
The Supreme Court hearing may not be the last word on this matter. Manitoba has
brought a judicial review in Federal Court of the federal government’s decision to
list it under the Act, relying on constitutional and administrative law grounds.
Although the constitutional issues will likely be moot after the Supreme Court rules,
the administrative law issues will still have to be decided if the Supreme Court ﬁnds
the Act to be constitutional. Manitoba’s judicial review is scheduled to be heard
December 7 to 9, 2020.22
IV. THE NATIONAL CONCERN DOCTRINE
Although several interveners have raised other heads of power to support the Act,
the federal government has only relied on the national concern doctrine,23 as did all
of the judges who upheld the Act.24 Accordingly, this paper will focus on the
national concern doctrine, rather than other federal heads of power. It also will not
20
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74, at para. 943 (Alta. C.A.).
21
Alberta originally sought to appeal its win to ensure its court’s decision would be
before the Supreme Court when the other appeals were heard. Once British Columbia
appealed, however, the Court ordered that only British Columbia’s appeal was to proceed
with Alberta as the respondent.
22

Manitoba v. Canada (Governor in Council), Federal Court File No. T-685-19.

23

In its Supreme Court factum, Canada in one paragraph purports to rely on any other
head of power raised by an intervener but does not actively make any arguments about them
itself. Factum of the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada in Saskatchewan (Attorney
General) v. Canada (Attorney General); Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney
General), Supreme Court File Nos. 38663 and 38781, para. 168.
24
The Saskatchewan and Alberta majorities expressly rejected the argument the Act
could be supported by any other head of power. Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act, [2019] S.J. No. 156, 2019 SKCA 40, at paras. 165-202 (Sask. C.A.), per
Richards C.J.S.; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234,
2020 ABCA 74, at paras. 257-261 (Alta. C.A.), per Fraser C.J.A. The Ontario majority did
consider other heads of power after upholding the Act under the national concern doctrine.
Justice Huscroft (dissenting) rejected supporting the Act under the emergency branch of
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consider the issues the reference raises concerning unconstitutional taxation and the
constitutional limits on regulatory charges.
At their heart, the federal government’s submissions take an Ottawa-centric
position that presumes federal jurisdiction is necessary to combat climate change
because the provinces cannot be trusted to do it themselves. In essence, the federal
government’s position boils down to: (1) climate change is a threat of national and
international importance; (2) greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activity
are a signiﬁcant driver of climate change; (3) to combat climate change, Canada
must take action to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions; and (4) therefore,
Parliament must have jurisdiction to combat this “existential threat”.25
Steps (1) to (3) are all factual statements that none of the provinces dispute; step
(4), however, does not logically follow from steps (1) to (3). On the contrary, the
constitution assigns many of the most important aspects of modern society such as
health care, education, social assistance, policing, local government, professional
regulation, etc., to the provinces who work cooperatively with each other and the
federal government to achieve national goals.
In attempting to demonstrate that such cooperation is insufficient to combat
climate change and that Parliament must have jurisdiction to impose the solution it
deems best, the federal government overemphasizes the importance of the so-called
provincial inability “test” and unduly minimizes the impact conferring jurisdiction
over climate change on Parliament would have on Canada’s federal constitution. If
adopted by the Supreme Court, the federal government’s interpretation of the
national concern doctrine would allow Parliament to take jurisdiction over broad
swathes of hitherto provincial matters and unbalance the constitutional division of
powers without resort to a constitutional amendment supported by signiﬁcant
provincial consent (and which would allow dissenting provinces to opt out).
1.

The Early History of the National Concern Doctrine

The national concern doctrine is based in the opening words of section 91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867:
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of
Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and
for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms
of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters
POGG. Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
ONCA 544, at para. 140 (per Strathy C.J.O.) and paras. 216-219 (per Huscroft J.A.,
dissenting) (Ont. C.A.).
25
Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, paras. 3 and 97, Supreme Court File Nos.
38663 and 38781.
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coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
. . .26

In addition to the enumerated matters set out in the remainder of section 91,
Parliament therefore has jurisdiction to make laws in relation to matters that fall
outside the provincial matters enumerated in sections 92 to 95. This jurisdiction is
usually referred to as Parliament’s “Peace, Order and Good Government” or
“POGG” power.
Parliament’s POGG power includes matters that did not exist at all at the time of
Confederation (the “gap” branch) and the power to make laws to deal with
temporary emergencies such as war or a pandemic (the “emergency” branch). But
it also has been held to extend to granting Parliament permanent jurisdiction over
matters that did fall within provincial jurisdiction at Confederation but have since
been transformed into matters of “national concern”. As Lord Watson put it in the
Local Prohibition case,
Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in their origin local and provincial,
might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion, and to
justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their regulation or abolition in
the interest of the Dominion. But great caution must be observed in distinguishing
between that which is local or provincial, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
provincial legislatures, and that which has ceased to be merely local or provincial,
and has become matter of national concern, in such sense as to bring it within the
jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.27

After a lengthy period in which the Privy Council doubted the existence of a distinct
national concern branch of POGG, Viscount Simon reaffirmed its existence in
Canada Temperance Foundation.28 Subsequently, the Supreme Court relied on the
national concern doctrine to uphold federal jurisdiction over aeronautics29 and the
National Capital Region.30
2.

The Anti-Inﬂation Reference

The Supreme Court gave more considered attention to the scope of the national
concern doctrine (as well as the emergency branch of POGG) in the Anti-Inﬂation
Reference.31 Another “existential threat” troubled the federation in the 1970s: the
growing scourge of double-digit inﬂation. In response, Parliament passed the
26

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.

27

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1896] J.C.J. No. 1, [1896]
A.C. 348, at 361 (P.C.).
28

[1946] J.C.J. No. 7, [1946] A.C. 193 (P.C.).

29

Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), [1951] S.C.J. No. 50, [1952] 1
S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.).
30
Munro v. Canada (National Capital Commission), [1966] S.C.J. No. 46, [1966] S.C.R.
663 (S.C.C.).
31

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.).
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Anti-Inﬂation Act.32 The Act’s Preamble stated that “the Parliament of Canada
recognizes that inﬂation in Canada at current levels is contrary to the interests of all
Canadians and that the containment and reduction of inﬂation has become a matter
of serious national concern”.33 The Act allowed the Governor in Council to set
guidelines for the restraint of prices and proﬁt margins and compensation.34 It
applied of its own force to the private sector and the federal public sector. By
agreement between the federal government and a province, it could also apply to the
provincial public sector.35
Faced with growing criticism of the Act as it applied to provincially regulated
industries, the federal government referred the question of the Act’s validity to the
Supreme Court. The Court, by a 7-2 majority, held that the Act could be upheld
under the emergency branch of POGG as a temporary measure designed to combat
a national emergency.36 Chief Justice Laskin, writing for four judges, held that it
was therefore unnecessary to consider the national concern doctrine.37
Justice Beetz, writing for the majority of the Court on this issue, did consider the
national concern doctrine. He concluded that, however important combatting
inﬂation might be, giving Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over such an amorphous
subject matter would sound the death knell of Canadian federalism:
Parliament could control all inventories in the largest as in the smallest undertakings, industries, and trades. Parliament could ration not only food but practically
everything else in order to prevent hoarding and unfair proﬁts. One could even go
farther and argue that since inﬂation and productivity are greatly interdependent,
Parliament could regulate productivity, establish quotas and impose the output of
goods or services which corporations, industries, factories, groups, areas, villages,
farmers, workers, should produce in any given period. Indeed, since practically any
activity or lack of activity affects the gross national product, the value of the
Canadian dollar and, therefore, inﬂation, it is difficult to see what would be beyond
the reach of Parliament.38

Inﬂation was not, in Beetz J.’s view, an appropriate matter for Parliament to
32

Anti-Inﬂation Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75.

33

Anti-Inﬂation Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75, Preamble.

34

Anti-Inﬂation Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75, s. 3.

35

Anti-Inﬂation Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75, s. 4.

36

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 391-426
(per Laskin C.J.C.) and 436-440 (per Ritchie J.) (S.C.C.). Justice Beetz, dissenting on this
point, argued that Parliament’s invocation of an emergency had to be explicit. Reference re
Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 459-472 (S.C.C.), per Beetz
J.
37

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 419
(S.C.C.), per Laskin C.J.C.
38

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 437 (per
Ritchie J.) and 443-445 (per Beetz J.) (S.C.C.).
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regulate under the national concern doctrine:
I fail to see how the authorities which so decide lend support to the ﬁrst submission.
They had the effect of adding by judicial process new matters or new classes of
matters to the federal list of powers. However, this was done only in cases where
a new matter was not an aggregate but had a degree of unity which made it
indivisible, an identity which made it distinct from provincial matters and a
sufficient consistence to retain the bounds of form. The scale upon which these new
matters enabled Parliament to touch on provincial matters had also to be taken into
consideration before they were recognized as federal matters: if an enumerated
federal power designated in broad terms such as the trade and commerce power had
to be construed so as not to embrace and smother provincial powers (Parson’s case)
and destroy the equilibrium of the Constitution, the Courts must be all the more
careful not to add hitherto unnamed powers of a diffuse nature to the list of federal
powers.
The “containment and reduction of inﬂation” does not pass muster as a new subject
matter. It is an aggregate of several subjects some of which form a substantial part
of provincial jurisdiction. It is totally lacking in speciﬁcity. It is so pervasive that
it knows no bounds. Its recognition as a federal head of power would render most
provincial powers nugatory.39

3.

The Environmental Cases

In a trio of cases in the 1980s and ’90s, the Supreme Court used the national
concern doctrine to grant Parliament jurisdiction over one narrow aspect of
environmental law (marine pollution) closely associated with its existing powers
over ocean pollution.40 It repeatedly denied, however, that the environment or
pollution generally were matters of national concern.
In R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.,41 the Court split 4-3 on whether
Parliament could regulate pollution in marine (i.e., salt) waters within a province.
Justice Le Dain for the majority set out the now classic four-part test for the use of
the national concern doctrine:
1.

The national concern doctrine is separate and distinct from the national
emergency doctrine of the peace, order and good government power,
which is chieﬂy distinguishable by the fact that it provides a constitutional
basis for what is necessarily legislation of a temporary nature.

2.

The national concern doctrine applies to both new matters which did not

39

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 458
(S.C.C.), per Beetz J.
40

Parliament can regulate ocean pollution not only under its powers over the public
property (s. 91(1A)), navigation and shipping (s. 91(10)), ﬁsheries (s. 91(12)), and the
criminal law (s. 91(27)) but under its plenary power to make laws for any part of Canada not
part of a province (Constitution Act, 1871 (U.K.), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28, s. 4) and the gap
branch of POGG.
41

[1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.).
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exist at Confederation and to matters which, although originally matters of
a local or private nature in a province, have since, in the absence of
national emergency, become matters of national concern.
3.

For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense it
must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on
provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution.

4.

In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it
from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what would be
the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal
effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspect of
the matter.42

Justice Le Dain went on to ﬁnd that marine pollution was indivisible from ocean
pollution because of the difficulty of ascertaining by visual observation the boundary
between the territorial sea and the internal marine waters of a state, not just because
of the possibility or likelihood of pollutants moving across that boundary. At the
same time, the differences in composition and action of marine waters and fresh
waters meant marine pollution had its own characteristics and scientiﬁc considerations that distinguished it from freshwater pollution. The impact of giving
Parliament jurisdiction over marine pollution therefore had ascertainable and
reasonable limits.43
It is important to note that, contrary to the arguments put forward by the federal
government and the interveners that support it, Le Dain J. did not ﬁnd that the fact
that an individual province might not wish to or even be unable to regulate a matter
effectively on its own was sufficient to grant Parliament jurisdiction over it as a
matter of national concern. The so-called “test” was only “one of the indicia for
determining whether a matter has that character of singleness or indivisibility
required to bring it within the national concern doctrine”.44 As Le Dain J. warned,
“the ‘provincial inability’ test must not, however, go so far as to provide a rationale
for the general notion, hitherto rejected in the cases, that there must be a plenary
jurisdiction in one order of government or the other to deal with any legislative
42

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at
431-432 (S.C.C.).
43

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at
436-438 (S.C.C.).
44

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 434
(S.C.C.).
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problem”.45 Furthermore, even when provincial inability did help establish that a
matter had the necessary singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility, it remained
necessary to consider the second step of the national concern test: did recognizing
the matter as a matter of national concern have a “scale of impact on provincial
jurisdiction that was reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative
power under the Constitution”?46 In the event, Le Dain J. did not even consider
whether the provinces could regulate “marine pollution” in deciding it should be
recognized as a matter of national concern.47
Justice La Forest, for the minority, warned of the danger of considering a number
of separate areas of activity, some federal and some provincial, a single, indivisible
matter of national concern: “By conceptualizing broad social, economic and
political issues in that way, one can effectively invent new heads of federal power
under the national dimensions doctrine.”48 Matters such as the control of inﬂation or
environmental protection “are all-pervasive, and if accepted as items falling within
the general power of Parliament, would radically alter the division of legislative
power in Canada”.49 The concerns Beetz J. raised about recognizing inﬂation as a
matter of national concern applied a fortiori to the environment:
All physical activities have some environmental impact. Possible legislative
responses to such activities cover a large number of the enumerated legislative
powers, federal and provincial. To allocate the broad subject-matter of environmental control to the federal government under its general power would effectively
gut provincial legislative jurisdiction. . . . [E]nvironmental pollution alone is itself
all-pervasive. It is a by-product of everything we do. . . .
To allocate environmental pollution exclusively to the federal Parliament would, it
seems to me, involve sacriﬁcing the principles of federalism enshrined in the
Constitution. . . . I would add to the legislative subjects that would be substantially
eviscerated the control of the public domain and municipal government. Indeed as
Beetz J. in Re: Anti-Inﬂation Act, supra, at p. 458, stated of the proposed power
over inﬂation, there would not be much left of the distribution of power if
Parliament had exclusive jurisdiction over this subject.50
45

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 434
(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 432
(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at
436-438 (S.C.C.).
48
R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 452
(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 454
(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at
454-456 (S.C.C.).
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Justice La Forest then went on to ﬁnd that these same concerns applied to the
narrower proposed matter of marine pollution which he found could not be
separated from freshwater pollution.51
Four years later, in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of
Transport), La Forest J. made clear that the concerns he expressed about the
potential dangers of recognizing the environment or pollution as matters of national
concern were shared by the Court as a whole:
I earlier referred to the environment as a diffuse subject, echoing what I said in R.
v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., supra, to the effect that environmental control,
as a subject matter, does not have the requisite distinctiveness to meet the test under
the “national concern” doctrine as articulated by Beetz J. in Reference re
Anti-Inﬂation Act, supra. Although I was writing for the minority in Crown
Zellerbach, this opinion was not contested by the majority. The majority simply
decided that marine pollution was a matter of national concern because it was
predominantly extra-provincial and international in character and implications, and
possessed signiﬁcantly distinct and separate characteristics as to make it subject to
Parliament’s residual power.52

After all, as Professor Le Dain (as he then was) wrote in an article cited by Beetz
J. in the Anti-Inﬂation Reference, “there is an increasing tendency to sum up a wide
variety of legislative purposes in single, comprehensive designations. Control of
inﬂation, environmental protection, and preservation of national identity or independence are examples”.53
Five years later, in R. v. Hydro-Québec, La Forest J. again noted that the national
concern doctrine “inevitably raises profound issues respecting the federal structure
of our Constitution”54 and should be resorted to only with great caution:
In Crown Zellerbach, the minority (at p. 453) expressed the view that the subject
of environmental protection was all-pervasive and if accepted as falling within the
general legislative domain of Parliament under the national concern doctrine, could
radically alter the division of legislative power in Canada.
The minority position on this point (which was not addressed by the majority) was
subsequently accepted by the whole Court in Oldman River, supra, at p. 64. The
general thrust of that case is that the Constitution should be so interpreted as to
afford both levels of government ample means to protect the environment while
maintaining the general structure of the Constitution. This is hardly consistent with
51

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at
456-460 (S.C.C.).
52
[1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 64 (per La Forest J.) and 81 (per Stevenson
J., dissenting on other grounds) (S.C.C.).
53
Gerald Le Dain, Q.C., “Sir Lyman Duff and the Constitution” (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 261, at 293, cited by Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 373, at 451 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J. [emphasis added].
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R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, at para. 110 (S.C.C.).
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an enthusiastic adoption of the “national dimensions” doctrine.55

Chief Justice Lamer and Iacobucci J., dissenting on whether the impugned
provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act56 could be supported
under the criminal law power, went on to consider the national concern doctrine and
made it clear that the Crown Zellerbach test had to be applied strictly to preserve the
federal nature of Canada’s constitution:
The test for singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility is a demanding one.
Because of the high potential risk to the Constitution’s division of powers presented
by the broad notion of “national concern”, it is crucial that one be able to specify
precisely what it is over which the law purports to claim jurisdiction. Otherwise
“national concern” could rapidly expand to absorb all areas of provincial jurisdiction.57

They also made it clear that the constitutionality of the Act had to be determined
based on the full scope of what it authorized the federal Executive to do, not just the
more limited use the government had made of the powers granted at the time of the
challenge:
However, the constitutional validity of a statute cannot depend on the ebb and ﬂow
of existing government practice or the manner in which discretionary powers
appear thus far to be exercised. It is the boundaries to the exercise of that discretion
and the scope of the regulatory power created by the impugned legislation that are
at issue here. It is no answer to a charge that a law is unconstitutional to say that
it is only used sparingly. If it is unconstitutional, it cannot be used at all.58

V. THE JUDGES THAT SUPPORTED
AND SUBSTANCE

THE

ACT UNDULY NARROWED ITS PITH

The majority of the Ontario and Saskatchewan courts and the dissent in Alberta
found that the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act was a valid exercise of
Parliament’s national concern power. In doing so, they all rejected the federal
government’s proposed deﬁnition of the Act’s pith and substance as merely the
“cumulative dimensions of greenhouse gas emissions”,59 but went on to adopt their
55
R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, at paras. 115-116
(S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 16.

57

R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, at para. 67 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, at para. 73 (S.C.C.)
[underlining in original].
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
ONCA 544, at paras. 74 (per Strathy C.J.O.), paras. 165-166 (per Hoy A.C.J.O.) and paras.
209-210 and 227 (per Huscroft J.A., dissenting); Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act, [2019] S.J. No. 156, 2019 SKCA 40, at paras. 127-138 (Sask. C.A.), per
Richards C.J.S.; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234,
2020 ABCA 74, at paras. 935-945 (Alta. C.A.), per Feehan J.A.
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own artiﬁcially narrow deﬁnitions of the Act’s pith and substance.
The majority in Ontario held the Act’s pith and substance was “establishing
minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”, while the
concurring judge held it was “establishing minimum national greenhouse gas
emissions pricing standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”.60 The majority in
Saskatchewan held it was “the establishment of minimum national standards of
price stringency for GHG emissions”.61 The dissenting judge in Alberta held that it
was “effecting behavioural change throughout Canada leading to increased energy
efficiencies by the use of minimum national standards necessary and integral to the
stringent pricing of greenhouse gas emissions”.62
As Huscroft J.A. pointed out in dissent in Ontario, however, these deﬁnitions beg
the question. The Ontario majority’s deﬁnition left unanswered the key question for
classiﬁcation purposes — minimum standards of what? Parliament can of course set
minimum standards for matters that fall within its jurisdiction but the very question
at issue is whether the Act falls within federal jurisdiction, which in turn depends on
whether the matter for which Parliament desires to set national standards falls within
the scope of the national concern doctrine. Associate Chief Justice Hoy, on the other
hand, like the Saskatchewan majority, conﬂated the means Parliament adopted to
achieve its goal with the ultimate purpose Parliament was seeking to achieve.63
Justice Feehan in dissent in Alberta did both — he conﬂated the means Parliament
had adopted (stringent pricing) and its purpose (reducing greenhouse gas emissions)
and left open the question of which minimum standards Parliament had jurisdiction
to impose.
All of these deﬁnitions fail to take into account the breadth of the Act. The Act’s
Preamble sets out the breadth of its purpose — Parliament intended to take
“comprehensive action to reduce emissions across all sectors of the economy,
accelerate clean economic growth and build resilience to the impacts of climate
change”.64 The Act’s proposed effects are similarly comprehensive. All “fuels” (i.e.,
any “substance, material, or thing” prescribed by the Governor in Council) sold,
consumed, produced or imported into Canada can be subject to the “charges”
60

Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
ONCA 544, at paras. 77 (per Strathy C.J.O.) and paras. 166 and 187 (per Hoy A.C.J.O.) (Ont.
C.A.).
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] S.J. No. 156, 2019 SKCA
40, at para. 125 (Sask. C.A.), per Richards C.J.S.
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74, at para. 944 (Alta. C.A.), per Feehan J.A.
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
ONCA 544, at paras. 211-212 and paras. 224-226 (Ont. C.A.), per Huscroft J.A., dissenting.
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Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, Preamble [emphasis
added].
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imposed by Part 1. Any facility that meets prescribed criteria can be required to
participate in the emissions trading scheme imposed by Part 2, including having to
purchase or acquire compliance certiﬁcates for any “greenhouse gases” it emits (i.e.,
any gas prescribed by the Governor in Council), report regularly whatever
information the Governor in Council prescribes to the federal Minister, and subject
itself to detailed compliance requirements.65
Parliament’s decision that provinces must regulate greenhouse gas emissions in
the way Parliament thinks best (no matter how effective other, non-pricing-based
mechanisms might be) or risk having the federal government impose charges on
virtually every activity that takes place in those provinces belies attempts to narrow
the Act’s pith and substance. The Act is not limited to setting minimum standards for
greenhouse gas reductions. Nor does it only establish minimum pricing standards to
the extent they are necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A province that,
like Ontario, achieves signiﬁcant greenhouse gas reductions through non-pricingbased mechanisms would not satisfy the Act’s requirements even if it achieved
greater reductions than provinces that do adopt carbon pricing.66 Rather, as the
Alberta majority and Huscroft J.A. correctly found, the pith and the substance of the
Act is the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions simpliciter.67
VI. THE ACT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED UNDER
DOCTRINE
1.

THE

NATIONAL CONCERN

Should the National Concern Test Be Modiﬁed?

The Alberta majority argued that the national concern doctrine should only be
available if a matter did not fall within the provinces’ speciﬁc enumerated powers.
A matter could only be found to be a matter of national concern if, at Confederation,
it did not exist or fell within the provinces’ section 92(16) residual power over “all
Matters of a merely local or private Nature”.68
The Alberta majority’s argument has support in the text of the Constitution. The
opening words of section 91 make it clear that, unlike Parliament’s enumerated
powers which apply “notwithstanding anything in this Act”, its POGG power only
65

Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 3, 166(1)(a), 169,
171-174, 190-192, 197-198, 203. Output-Based Pricing System Regulations, SOR/2019-266.
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Ontario achieved the single-largest reduction in greenhouse gases in Canadian history
(up to 30 Mt annually — the equivalent of taking seven million vehicles off the road) by a
non-pricing measure — requiring the closure of all coal-ﬁred electricity plants in the
province.
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74, at paras. 252-256 (Alta. C.A.), per Fraser C.J.A.; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019 ONCA 544, at paras. 204-213 (Ont. C.A.), per
Huscroft J.A., dissenting.
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Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74, at paras. 160-189 (Alta. C.A.), per Fraser C.J.A.
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applies “to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces”. It also has support in the
case law. Both Beetz J. in the Anti-Inﬂation Reference and Le Dain J. in Crown
Zellerbach speak of matters of a local or private nature, not speciﬁcally enumerated
provincial matters, being able to be transformed into matters of national concern.69
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will so drastically limit the
national concern doctrine. Too many of the national concern cases have concerned
matters that fall within provincial enumerated powers over matters such as tavern
licensing,70 municipal institutions71 and electricity generation.72 Although there are
good arguments that each of those cases involved new matters not anticipated at
Confederation (aeronautics, the national capital and nuclear energy respectively),
the Court is unlikely to want to permanently foreclose the possibility of a new matter
of national concern being recognized even thought that matter had historically been
regulated by the provinces under their enumerated powers.
Even if the Supreme Court is unlikely to limit the scope of the national concern
doctrine as severely as the Alberta majority did, there are still several aspects of the
test that should be clariﬁed. Drawing on the Court’s jurisprudence under the general
trade and commerce power, the requirement that a new matter of national concern
be distinct from provincial heads of power should mean qualitative difference, not
just a difference in scale. As in the Reference re Securities Act73 and the Reference
re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation,74 it is only matters that the provinces truly
are unable to regulate, either individually or collectively, that should fall within
federal jurisdiction. The systemic risk the Court found the provinces were unable to
regulate was not simply the sum of each individual province’s market risk (as
Canada’s national greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of each individual
province’s emissions). Rather, systemic risks are “risks that occasion a ‘domino
effect’ whereby the risk of default by one market participant will impact the ability
of others to fulﬁl their legal obligations, setting off a chain of negative economic
69

Reference re Anti-Inﬂation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 445 and
457 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J.; R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 401, at 431-432 (S.C.C.), per Le Dain J.
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consequences that pervade an entire ﬁnancial system”.75 Systemic risks are risks to
the market itself, not just a sum of risks to individual market participants; addressing
them therefore requires the ability to issue orders that can quickly take effect in
multiple jurisdictions across Canada.76
Similarly, to the degree provincial inability to act is considered in determining
whether a matter is single, distinct and indivisible,77 it is only jurisdictional inability
to act that should be considered, not a provincial decision to take a different
approach than the one Parliament prefers.78 Allowing courts to enter into a
functional analysis of whether the provinces are taking the “right” action oversteps
their proper role as guardians of the division of powers. Parliament remains free to
use its enumerated powers (if available) to set national standards if it wishes to do
so. Given the residual nature of the national concern doctrine, however, Parliament
should not be granted jurisdiction to regulate matters that the provinces are perfectly
capable of regulating but, in the exercise of their co-equal sovereignty, have chosen
not to (or chosen not to regulate in the manner Parliament prefers).
“Provincial inability” should also not allow Parliament to more easily regulate a
matter under the residual national concern power than under the enumerated general
trade and commerce power.79 Regulatory variability and policy experimentation is
a central feature of Canada’s constitution, not a ﬂaw to be ﬁxed by expanding federal
jurisdiction. The fact that one province’s decision not to act could have an adverse
impact on another province cannot be sufficient to give Parliament jurisdiction. In
today’s modern, interconnected world, almost every provincial decision to act or not
75

Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 2011 SCC 66,
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to act can have adverse impacts on other provinces. Instead of trying to assess the
severity of potential adverse impacts of one province’s policy decisions on other
provinces (an inherently political exercise ill-suited to adjudication by the courts),
the courts should instead focus, as the name “provincial inability” suggests, on
whether the provinces individually or collectively are capable of addressing a
problem without federal intervention. As will be discussed further below, there is no
doubt the provinces are capable of reducing greenhouse gas emissions; indeed, the
very “backstop” nature of the Act presumes it.
2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are Not a Single, Distinct and Indivisible
Matter
Even without those clariﬁcations, greenhouse gas emissions (however deﬁned)
are not a single, distinct and indivisible matter suitable for federal regulation as a
matter of national concern. In assessing the singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility of the proposed new matter, it is not sufficient to look only at the scope of the
Act (which, as discussed above, is itself strikingly broad), much less the scope of the
particular regulations that the federal government has chosen to enact at the present
time.
A new matter of national concern, once recognized, is not limited to the particular
Act at issue in the initial court challenge — it is a permanent new head of federal
jurisdiction that can potentially allow for a wide range of legislation. Any future
federal legislation that in pith and substance concerned the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions (which given the range of activities that produce greenhouse gas
emissions is a broad range of legislation indeed) would now fall within federal
jurisdiction. Witness, for example, the thousands of pages of federal legislation
supported by the aeronautics and telecommunications powers that go far beyond the
factual situations at issue in the Radio Reference80 and the Aeronautics Reference.81
As the Alberta majority correctly found, a court cannot prelimit the scope of a new
matter of national concern to the precise legislation before the Court — Parliament
remains free to legislate in the future as it sees ﬁt in relation to that head of power.82
Unlike marine pollution, which “because of the differences in the composition
and action of marine waters and fresh waters, has its own characteristics and
scientiﬁc considerations that distinguish it from fresh water pollution”,83 greenhouse
gas emissions from any source have the same impact on climate change. There is
80
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thus no way to distinguish which greenhouse gas–producing activities should be
federally regulated from those which should remain provincially regulated. In fact,
the Act does not attempt to do so: it presumes that the same greenhouse
gas–producing activities can be regulated by the provinces (if they choose to enact
pricing mechanisms that are “sufficiently stringent” to meet with the federal
government’s approval) or by the federal government (if they do not). Yet, as the
Alberta majority recognized, with very few exceptions, concurrent jurisdiction is a
foreign concept to Canada’s constitution which assigns most matters exclusively to
either Parliament or the provincial legislatures.84
As Huscroft J.A. and the Alberta majority recognized, deﬁning a matter as
imposing “national standards” provides no intelligible standard by which to limit the
scope of the proposed matter. Minimum national standards could be established
concerning home heating and cooling; land use zoning; public transit; road design
and use; or any other matter that impacts greenhouse gas emissions. Minimum
national standards could be set for the quality of insulation used in homes. Minimum
national standards could be established for the fuel efficiency of cars for sale within
the province.85 The ubiquity of the activities that generate greenhouse gases means
that granting Parliament jurisdiction under the national concern doctrine to set
minimum national standards for greenhouse gas emissions would eviscerate
provincial jurisdiction over local undertakings, property and civil rights, and matters
of a local concern within the province. As the Alberta majority put it, “There is no
separate head of federal power relating to minimal national standards of anything.
Nor is backstoppism a separate head of federal power.”86
The narrower characterization of “minimum national pricing standards to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions”, adopted by Hoy A.C.J.O. in Ontario and the Saskatchewan majority (and with more adjectives added by Feehan J.A. in Alberta), does not
avoid this problem. It merely requires more creativity on the part of legislative
drafters. Almost any regulatory goal can be achieved through a pricing mechanism.
If Parliament were given jurisdiction to establish minimum national pricing
standards for greenhouse gas emissions, it could put a price on energy-inefficient
building materials; on air conditioners and home heating; on automobiles with
higher emissions; or even on which days an automobile is used or the density of
housing. This is precisely the concern Beetz J. raised in the Anti-Inﬂation Reference
84

Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2020] A.J. No. 234, 2020 ABCA
74, at para. 209 (Alta. C.A.), per Fraser C.J.A.; Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict.,
c. 3, ss. 92A(2)-(3), 93(4), 94A, 95.
85

Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] O.J. No. 3403, 2019
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as a reason why the control of inﬂation should not be recognized as a matter of
national concern. Greenhouse gases are a product of all we do. Giving Parliament
jurisdiction to set minimum national standards (or pricing standards) to regulate
greenhouse gases as a matter of national concern would expand federal jurisdiction
beyond limit.87
Nor are the provinces incapable of regulating greenhouse gas emissions on their
own. In fact, the entire premise of the Act as a “backstop” is a recognition by
Parliament that the provinces can effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions,
including by way of carbon pricing if they so choose. The federal government’s
concern is not that the provinces are unable to combat climate change; it is to
discourage provinces from adopting a different way of doing so than the one
mechanism Parliament believes is best by the threat of imposing federal charges on
their residents.88
Ensuring provincial compliance with Parliament’s wishes is not a proper reason
to give Parliament jurisdiction to regulate a matter under the national concern
doctrine. Justice Le Dain in Crown Zellerbach rejected Professor Gibson’s suggestion that the federal government could be granted national concern jurisdiction to
ensure provincial cooperation “where it would be possible to deal fully with the
problem by cooperative action of two or more legislatures” but there was a risk
those provincial legislatures might not cooperate. As Le Dain J. explained, such a
role for the federal government “would contemplate a concurrent or overlapping
federal jurisdiction which is in conﬂict with what was emphasized by Beetz J. in the
Anti-Inﬂation Act reference – that where a matter falls within the national concern
doctrine . . . Parliament has an exclusive jurisdiction of a plenary nature to legislate
in relation to that matter, including its intra-provincial aspects”.89 Yet that is exactly
the “backstop” role Parliament now wishes the Act to play. That is federal overreach,
not provincial inability.
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3.

The Act Has Too Great an Impact on Provincial Jurisdiction

Even if minimum national standards for greenhouse gas emissions were a single,
distinct and indivisible subject matter, granting Parliament jurisdiction to impose
them under the national concern doctrine would not “have a scale of impact on
provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of
legislative power under the Constitution”.90
Parliament can regulate many aspects of the environment under its enumerated
powers. For example, the federal government could invest further in interprovincial
railways, the greater use of which could signiﬁcantly contribute to the reduction of
greenhouse gases in Canada.91 It can use its criminal law powers to prohibit
activities such as coal-ﬁred electricity generation.92 Parliament can apply provincial
greenhouse gas reduction schemes to federally regulated undertakings as it has done
by Part 3 of the Act. It could potentially rely on the emergency branch of POGG to
support temporary measures to combat climate change (which the Act with its
long-term purposes of imposing a carbon price “that increases over time”, “holding
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C”, and “increasing
[Canada’s Paris Accord contributions] over time” is not).93 Finally, if it were willing
to bear the political cost of doing so, the federal government could ask Parliament
to impose a true “carbon tax” under its taxation power.94
But Parliament should not be given a plenary power over all aspects of a matter
so broad as regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Given the range of provincially
regulated activities that generate greenhouse gases, granting Parliament such a
power would dramatically and impermissibly alter the division of powers. So broad
an impact on provincial jurisdiction would be irreconcilable with the Constitution’s
intention to divide legislative power between Parliament and the provincial
legislatures.95 Echoing La Forest J.’s warning, put forward ﬁrst for the minority in
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Crown Zellerbach and then for the whole court in Oldman River, about the risks of
deﬁning new matters of national concern too broadly, giving the federal government
power over such a diffuse agglomeration of local matters as the activities that
generate greenhouse gases “would effectively gut provincial legislative jurisdiction”
because “all physical activities have some environmental [or greenhouse gas]
impact”.96
“National concern” should not be interpreted as granting Parliament the broad
power over greenhouse gas emissions that would be required to uphold the Act,
much less whatever future measures the federal government believes are necessary
to combat climate change. Doing so would result in a massive transfer of regulatory
power from the provincial to the federal level and is incompatible with the federal
nature of Canada’s constitution.97 If Parliament’s existing enumerated powers are
insufficient, there is always the option, as was done for old age security and
unemployment insurance in the past, of proposing a constitutional amendment.98 Or
Parliament could adopt the course it has wisely taken in other matters that are of
concern to the nation: work with the provinces. The Canada Health Act,99 the
co-existence of the CPP and the QPP, and cooperative capital markets regulation are
all further examples of how the diversity that is the heart of Canadian federalism
need not impair the country’s ability to come together to accomplish national goals.
Climate change is no different. Every government in Canada agrees that urgent
measures must be taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They do not all agree
that imposing a carbon price on consumers and large industry is the best means of
accomplishing that shared goal. Finding that the Act cannot be supported under the
national concern doctrine would deprive Parliament of the ability to order the
provinces to adopt its preferred policy approach or risk the imposition of “backstop”
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carbon pricing; it would not deprive Canada of the ability to take cooperative and
effective action to combat climate change.
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